JBO'C's Historical Reference

Turkmen Part 1 - Turkmen Part 2 - Turkmen Part 3 - Turkmen Part 4 - Turkmen Part 5 - Turkmen Part 6 - Turkmen Part 7 - Turkmen Part 8 - Turkmen Part 9 - Turkmen Part 10 - Turkmen Part 11 - Turkmen Part 12

Russians have been more vigilant in their efforts at paralyzing the strength of the Turkmen while the army from the Caspian was dealing a more direct blow against them. It is doubtful whether the Teke country can support its inhabitants, but considering the wealth and fertility of the Murghab valley it would seem as if they could disregard the cutting-off of their source of supply to the north. For that reason it is probable that there were other causes at work than those which were accepted in Turkestan as the reason for the Tekes becoming reconciled with the Persians.

It is most probable that the advance of General Lomakine to Kyzyl_Arva and Beurma in the summer of 1877, and the several defeats which he inflicted upon the Akhals, caused great apprehension among the Tekes themselves. That alarm would not be allayed by the subsequent retreat of Lomakine, when the Akhals appear to have harassed his retreating column very much, for the Tekes would well know that the Russians would return and in greater force.

The Akhals could but very imperfectly ward off the blow which Lomakine was evidently preparing for by frequent visits to Tblisi, and if they were unable to fulfill their part the brunt of the fray would devolve upon the Tekes/Tekke. In the winter of 1877 the return of Lomakine in the coming spring was clearly foreseen by the Merv chieftains, and it behooved them to decide what policy they would adopt in their own defense. To them it was evident that when the Russians returned it would be with the full determination to establish themselves at Kizil Arvat, if not in some more advanced position in the Akhal country.

Brought face to face with so serious a danger, their old antipathy for the Persian became a matter of secondary importance, and the loss of their old marauding privileges a thing of little moment. There was the possibility of the Persian Government combining with the Russian in revenge for past injuries, when the collapse of the Turkmen power must have been not only complete but immediate. The Tekes/Tekke were brought face to face with a double danger, from Russian hostility and from Persian long-standing indignation. It was resolved in the council of the chiefs to avert the latter by a timely surrender. The ruse, for such it was, was successful. The Persian Government was delighted with the sudden reformation of the Tekes, and hastily extended that formal protection over the Turkmen as its subjects to which attention has already been called. It is probable that when the Shah welcomed back his long- wandering subjects he did not consider the wide-reaching consequences of his recognition of the Teke country as being a portion of Persia.

When that arrangement was concluded it is doubtful whether there was as clear a view at Teheran of the importance of the Russian advance from Krasnovodsk as there was at Merv. The Persian Government saw but the fact that the Tekes wished to come to terms, and were willing to give the long-coveted hold upon Merv, and it did not delay its acceptance of the proposals so far as to inquire into the motives which actuated the Tekes/Tekke in their unprecedented compliance with Persian desires.

Since Lomakine has re-appeared, and in greater force, north of the Attock, and perhaps more particularly since the erection of a fortification at the place known as Chat, situated at the junction of the Sumbur and Atrek rivers, it is conceivable that a different view of the transaction is beginning to obtain at Teheran, where the new obligations incurred by Persia towards the Turkmen cannot be altogether ignored.

How Persia will consider herself bound to act in the event of the Russian troops advancing on Khelat-i-Nadiri is a very interesting question, but it cannot be answered with any great confidence. The actual acquisition of Sarakhs, the nominal authority to be exercised at Merv, have both given Persia as much as she can reasonably expect to secure from the Turkmen; and in that quarter no defensive and offensive alliance with Russia could give her more. Persia, having nothing to hope, and everything to fear, from Russia in Turkmenia, must be loath to assist Lomakine in any movement against Merv, which is now, technically at least, a Persian city. Sir Henry Rawalinson has declared, in a paper on the road to Merv, lately read before the Royal Geographical Society, that, with Persia hostile, an advance of a Russian army from the south-east shores of the Caspian upon Merv would be an impossibility; and unless Russian statesmen can dazzle the eyes of the Shah's ministers by some more seductive picture, it would appear that there is every reason for supposing that Persia will not regard the development of Lomakine's movement with anything but the greatest dislike. If such be the prevailing sentiment in Teheran, we may look for some interesting situations in the future stages of this question, and we may possibly have some new versions of the meaning of Persian citizenship.

Turkmen Part 1 - Turkmen Part 2 - Turkmen Part 3 - Turkmen Part 4 - Turkmen Part 5 - Turkmen Part 6 - Turkmen Part 7 - Turkmen Part 8 - Turkmen Part 9 - Turkmen Part 10 - Turkmen Part 11 - Turkmen Part 12

London, W.H.Allen & Co., 1879 8vo. 2 vols.

As seen on: http://books.google.com/books?id=cKABAAAAQAAJ&pg=PA223&dq=teke+salor#PPA221,M1

A special note this is drawn from Boulger's England and Russia in Central Asia. I have taken to edit it and standardize spelling. For instance Boulger mentioned two spellings Turkmen or Turcomans and proceeded to use Turcomans. I elected to change it to Turkmen since it is the more correct usage today. If this bothers you please read some other version since I am doing this or me rather than for you.