| The Turkmen
Part 8 Turkmen Part 1
- Turkmen Part 2
- Turkmen Part 3
- Turkmen Part 4
- Turkmen Part 5
- Turkmen Part 6
- The Turkmen Part 7
- Turkmen Part 8
- Turkmen Part 9
- Turkmen Part 10
- Turkmen Part 11
- Turkmen Part 12
Without following this subject at greater length at
the present moment, it will be instructive to remember
that both England and Russia are bound by treaty to
respect the integrity of Persia; and that technically,
and now actually, the Teke country as far as Merv is a
portion of the province of Khorasan. This is no new claim
invented yesterday, but one of established historical
veracity; and the southern Turkmen
— the Tekes more especially — are Persian
subjects by position and association. The question then
arises, Are not the guaranteeing Powers restrained
against any aggressive act against these Persian subjects
by the terms of the treaty? Is it compatible with past
stipulations that fresh conquests should be snatched from
the Tekes, who are now de facto subjects of the Shah?
These are very important questions, which require an
authoritative answer. Hitherto our Foreign Secretaries
have raised objections to Russia's movements in Kara Kum,
because they threatened the integrity of Merv, a question
of vital importance to this country; but now it appears
that these same operations are directed against Persian
territory and subjects, both of which the St. Petersburg
Government is bound to respect. Nor is this view of the Turkmen
being Persian subjects far-fetched, for such they are by
all practical ties, and in that fact the only hope for a
continuance of their independence remains. Whatever
doubt, too, there may be of the whole Teke country having
become an integral part of the Persian dominions, there
can be no question of the town of Sarakhs having become
so, and of all places, before the capture of Merv, and
Sarakhs is the most important in this region. Therefore a
Russian advance on Sarakhs would certainly be an
infringement of Persian territory, and, as a strict
matter of fact, any move beyond the Akhal fort at Anef
would be in the same category, and should be firmly
resisted with all the diplomatic force at our disposal.
If persisted in, it should be held to be a hostile act,
and as such to be met. The importance of Sarakhs, on the
high road from Meshed to Merv, Charjui, and Bokhara, is,
as Sir Henry Rawlinson has said, that it is only by it
that an advance could be made on Merv from the west.
There is no information of any road existing from Abuverd
through the Tejend swamp to Merv, and consequently an
army coming from Kizil Arvat would have to occupy Sarakhs
in the first place.
The arrangement between the Tekes and the Shah has
therefore been so far pregnant with beneficial results,
that it has pushed Persian territory forward so as to
intervene between the Russian forces north of the Attock
and the oasis of Merv. An opportunity is thus afforded
this country of achieving a very material advantage by
strengthening the ties which have been established
between the Persians and the Turkmen.
By extending the Persian frontier up to the old limits of
Khorasan, that is to say, by including the country from
Ashkhabad to Merv, and by enforcing existing treaties, we
can erect in the path of Lomakine an obstacle which he
dare not encounter unless he be prepared to undertake
that great war which, however inevitable in the end,
Russia is at present so unfit to wage. The view that has
just been taken of this transaction is, we believe, the
most probable one, but we must not ignore the
Machiavellian designs which are by some considered to be
at the root of this proceeding.
The first view is that Persia has been acting throughout
in collusion with Russia, and that the Turkmen have taken
service under the Shah in order to share in some great
enterprise in Western Afghanistan. Bribery has made the Turkmen
complacent, and the promise of Herat has won over the
Shah. Of this tripartite arrangement none of the parties
would obtain any permanent benefit save Russia, and it
would be wronging the astuteness of the Persian, or even
of the Turkmen,
to suppose that they are so shallow as not to perceive
this as clearly as we do.
The second view is that although Russia had nothing to do
with the negotiations between Persia and the Tekes, yet,
now that they have been consummated, she has striven,
and, according to these, successfully, to turn the result
to her personal advantage. According to this view there
is the same tripartite arrangement, made for the same
ends and between the same parties.
Both these views are fanciful, and give Russia a credit
for superhuman astuteness to which she is by no means
entitled. The probable state of the case is that Persia,
without being downright hostile, is watchful and
suspicious of Russia's designs — perhaps also
nervous at the progress of events on the Atrek and round
Kizil Arvat ; that the Turkmen
are fairly alarmed at the danger of their position, and
anxiously regarding the attitude of both Persia and this
country and it is just possible that, in the event of the
former refusing to perform its duties, and of the latter
remaining passive, they may throw up the sponge and come
to terms with Lomakine. The Russians themselves are
hampered by some of the doubts that must beset them when
on the point of attempting another great enterprise in
Central Asia. In the meanwhile they are gathering their
strength to a point, so that when the blow has to be
struck it may be dealt rapidly and without hesitation. On
the action of Persia the whole affair depends. The Shah
can inspire the Turkmen
with the necessary courage, and he can provide them with
most of their wants. He can, by withholding supplies, and
by giving carte blanche to the Kurd borderers, seriously
delay the march of a Russian army beyond Kizil Arvat. But
of his intention to play this bold part there is no
evidence. His strict neutrality is probably the most the
Tekes can count upon.
One of the principal reasons for regarding the Turkmen
as among the best material for cavalry in the world is
that they possess an abundant supply of the most
excellent horses. They are mounted men at the present
moment, and as riders have few equals and no superiors.
In the tactics pursued by irregular cavalry they are
already adepts, and little would be left to be done by
the drill-sergeant. The weak point and for irregular
warfare it is their only weak point is their weapons.
Their most desperate onset — and those who have seen
a Turkmen
charge say that it is delivered in the most admirable
manner — breaks before the volleys of
rapidly-repeating rifles which deal destruction into
their ranks hundreds of yards before their own wretched
weapons can have any effect.
They have striven, not always with ill-success, to make
up for this inferiority by having recourse to stratagem,
and by selecting the night-time as the season for their
attack. But for the purposes of defensive warfare, such
as the defense of Merv, they are unfortunately without
the necessary means. They have no artillery, and their
own personal weapons are antiquated and useless for
modern warfare. Their valor and the excellence of their
horses can only very imperfectly supply those wants. But
the good qualities of the Turkmen
horses undoubtedly facilitate the task of converting
these tribes into the most formidable mounted force in
Central Asia.
The Turkmen
horse is not less an object of affection to his master
than the Arab is to his. When it has been decided to
carry out a raid into Persia, the Turkmen
puts his horse through a regular course of training, of
which the following is a description. For thirty days
before the time appointed for the start the animal is
exercised daily, part of that exercise being to gallop at
full speed for half an hour. Some hours after he is
brought in he is fed, his food consisting of six pounds
of hay, or clover-hay, and about three pounds of barley
or one-half the usual allowance of corn. During this
period as little water as possible is given to the horse.
Sometimes this period is shorter than the time specified,
particularly if the animal appears to be in the necessary
hard condition. But the preparatory course of training
does not stop here, although the start for the scene of
the proposed foray, or chapaoul, is then made. Each Turkmen
takes with him an inferior horse called yaboo, which he
himself rides until he reaches the place of action. It
then serves to carry back the plunder. The charger, as it
may be termed, follows bare-backed and without bridle his
master, and the advance is graduated so that the daily
march shall not be excessive. During this later stage,
which lasts from the time of starting until the arrival
at the scene where it is proposed to assail the Persian
village, the horse's food is changed to four pounds and a
quarter of barley flour, two pounds of maize flour, and
two pounds of raw sheep's-tail fat chopped very fine.
These are well mixed and kneaded together, and given to
the horse in the form of a ball.
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