| THE TURKMEN Part 8 Turkmen Part 1 - Turkmen Part 2 - Turkmen Part 3 - Turkmen Part 4 - Turkmen Part 5 - Turkmen Part 6 - The Turkmen Part 7 -
Turkmen Part 8 - Turkmen Part 9 - Turkmen Part 10 - Turkmen Part 11 - Turkmen Part 12
Without following this subject at greater length at
the present moment, it will be instructive to remember
that both England and Russia are bound by treaty to
respect the integrity of Persia; and that technically,
and now actually, the Tekes/Tekke
country as far as Merv is a portion of the province of
Khorasan. This is no new claim invented yesterday, but
one of established historical veracity; and the southern
Turkmen — the Tekes more especially — are
Persian subjects by position and association. The
question then arises, Are not the guaranteeing Powers
restrained against any aggressive act against these
Persian subjects by the terms of the treaty? Is it
compatible with past stipulations that fresh conquests
should be snatched from the Tekes, who are now de facto
subjects of the Shah? These are very important questions,
which require an authoritative answer. Hitherto our
Foreign Secretaries have raised objections to Russia's
movements in Kara Kum, because they threatened the
integrity of Merv, a question of vital importance to this
country; but now it appears that these same operations
are directed against Persian territory and subjects, both
of which the St. Petersburg Government is bound to
respect. Nor is this view of the Turkmen being Persian
subjects far-fetched, for such they are by all practical
ties, and in that fact the only hope for a continuance of
their independence remains. Whatever doubt, too, there
may be of the whole Teke country having become an
integral part of the Persian dominions, there can be no
question of the town of Sarakhs having become so, and of
all places, before the
capture of Merv, and Sarakhs is the most important in
this region. Therefore a Russian advance on Sarakhs would
certainly be an infringement of Persian territory, and,
as a strict matter of fact, any move beyond the Akhal
fort at Anef would be in the same category, and should be
firmly resisted with all the diplomatic force at our
disposal. If persisted in, it should be held to be a
hostile act, and as such to be met. The importance of
Sarakhs, on the high road from Meshed to Merv, Charjui,
and Bokhara, is, as Sir Henry
Rawalinson has said, that it is only by it that an
advance could be made on Merv from the west. There is
no information of any road existing from Abuverd through the Tejend swamp to
Merv, and
consequently an army coming from Kyzyl_Arvat would
have to occupy Sarakhs in the first place.
The arrangement between the Tekes and the Shah has
therefore been so far pregnant with beneficial results,
that it has pushed Persian territory forward so as to
intervene between
the Russian forces north of the Atock and the oasis of Merv. An
opportunity is thus afforded this country of achieving a
very material advantage by strengthening the ties which
have been established between the Persians and the
Turkmen. By extending the Persian frontier up to the old
limits of Khorasan, that is to say, by including the
country from Ashkhabad to Merv, and by enforcing existing
treaties, we can erect in the path of Lomakine an
obstacle which he dare not encounter unless he be
prepared to undertake that great war which, however
inevitable in the end, Russia is at present so unfit to
wage. The view that has just been taken of this
transaction is, we believe, the most probable one, but we
must not ignore the Machiavellian designs which are by
some considered to be at the root of this proceeding.
The first view is that Persia has been acting throughout
in collusion with Russia, and that the Turkmen have taken
service under the Shah in order to share in some great
enterprise in Western Afghanistan. Bribery has made the
Turkmen complacent, and the promise of Herat has won over
the Shah. Of this tripartite arrangement none of the
parties would obtain any permanent benefit save Russia,
and it would be wronging the astuteness of the Persian,
or even of the Turkmen, to suppose that they are so
shallow as not to perceive this as clearly as we do.
The second view is that although Russia had nothing to do
with the negotiations between Persia and the Tekes, yet,
now that they have been consummated, she has striven,
and, according to these, successfully, to turn the result
to her personal advantage. According to this view there
is the same tripartite arrangement, made for the same
ends and between the same parties.
Both these views are fanciful, and give Russia a credit
for superhuman astuteness to which she is by no means
entitled. The probable state of the case is that Persia,
without being downright hostile, is watchful and
suspicious of Russia's designs — perhaps also
nervous at the progress of events on the Etrek and round Etrek; that the
Turkmen are fairly alarmed at the danger of their
position, and anxiously regarding the attitude of both
Persia and this country and it is just possible that, in
the event of the former refusing to perform its duties,
and of the latter remaining passive, they may throw up
the sponge and come to terms with Lomakine. The Russians
themselves are hampered by some of the doubts that must
beset them when on the point of attempting another great
enterprise in Central Asia. In the meanwhile they are
gathering their strength to a point, so that when the
blow has to be struck it may be dealt rapidly and without
hesitation. On the action of Persia the whole affair
depends. The Shah can inspire the Turkmen with the
necessary courage, and he can provide them with most of
their wants. He
can, by withholding supplies, and by giving carte blanche
to the Kurd borderers, seriously delay the march of a
Russian army beyond Kizil Arvat. But of his intention
to play this bold part there is no evidence. His strict
neutrality is probably the most the Tekes can count upon.
One of the principal reasons for regarding the Turkmen as
among the best material for cavalry in the world is that
they possess an abundant supply of the most excellent
horses. They are mounted men at the present moment, and
as riders have few equals and no superiors. In the
tactics pursued by irregular cavalry they are already
adepts, and little would be left to be done by the
drill-sergeant. The weak point and for irregular warfare
it is their only weak point is their weapons. Their most
desperate onset — and those who have seen a Turkmen
charge say that it is delivered in the most admirable
manner — breaks before the volleys of
rapidly-repeating rifles which deal destruction into
their ranks hundreds of yards before their own wretched
weapons can have any effect.
They have striven, not always with ill-success, to make
up for this inferiority by having recourse to stratagem,
and by selecting the night-time as the season for their
attack. But for the purposes of defensive warfare, such as the defense of Merv,
they are unfortunately without the necessary means. They
have no artillery, and their own personal weapons are
antiquated and useless for modern warfare. Their valor
and the excellence of their horses can only very
imperfectly supply those wants. But the good qualities of
the Turkmen horses undoubtedly facilitate the task of
converting these tribes into the most formidable mounted
force in Central Asia.
The Turkmen horse is not less an object of affection to
his master than the Arab is to his. When it has been
decided to carry out a raid into Persia, the Turkmen puts
his horse through a regular course of training, of which
the following is a description. For thirty days before
the time appointed for the start the animal is exercised
daily, part of that exercise being to gallop at full
speed for half an hour. Some hours after he is brought in
he is fed, his food consisting of six pounds of hay, or
clover-hay, and about three pounds of barley or one-half
the usual allowance of corn. During this period as little
water as possible is given to the horse. Sometimes this
period is shorter than the time specified, particularly
if the animal appears to be in the necessary hard
condition. But the preparatory course of training does
not stop here, although the start for the scene of the
proposed foray, or chapaoul, is then made. Each Turkmen
takes with him an inferior horse called yaboo, which he
himself rides until he reaches the place of action. It
then serves to carry back the plunder. The charger, as it
may be termed, follows bare-backed and without bridle his
master, and the advance is graduated so that the daily
march shall not be excessive. During this later stage,
which lasts from the time of starting until the arrival
at the scene where it is proposed to assail the Persian
village, the horse's food is changed to four pounds and a
quarter of barley flour, two pounds of maize flour, and
two pounds of raw sheep's-tail fat chopped very fine.
These are well mixed and kneaded together, and given to
the horse in the form of a ball.
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